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Matter of A-R-C-G- and Domestic 
Violence Asylum: A Glimmer of Hope 
Amidst a Continuing Need for Reform 
CAROLINE MCGEE* 
In August 2014, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
issued its first published decision recognizing domestic vio-
lence as a basis for asylum. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA 
held that a woman who had suffered horrific abuse at the 
hands of her husband in her native Guatemala qualified for 
asylum as a member of a particular social group. The land-
mark decision came after years of uncertainty regarding the 
viability of domestic violence asylum claims and fourteen 
years after the BIA had rejected domestic violence as a basis 
for asylum in Matter of R-A-. Parts I and II of this Comment 
provide an overview of asylum law and the development of 
domestic violence asylum prior to A-R-C-G-. Part III dis-
cusses the BIA’s holding in A-R-C-G- and Part IV argues 
that, despite the BIA’s promising holding in A-R-C-G-, 
amendments to the asylum regulations are still needed to 
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Before its August 26, 2014 decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) had been silent on the con-
troversial issue of domestic violence asylum for fourteen years.1 
While other countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, be-
gan to recognize asylum claims from women who were fleeing per-
secution at the hands of their spouses and domestic partners in the 
early 1990s,2 the United States lagged behind with inconsistent and 
arbitrary decisions. In 1999, however, the BIA dealt a huge blow to 
domestic violence victims who hoped to seek refuge in the United 
States.3 In Matter of R-A-, the BIA held that Rody Alvarado, who 
had been repeatedly raped and abused by her husband, failed to 
show that she was a member of a particular social group in order to 
                                                                                                             
 1 Molly Redden, Top Immigration Court Hands Huge Win to Battered 
Women Seeking Asylum. Conservatives Freak Out., MOTHER JONES (Aug. 28, 
2014, 10:29 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/doj-immigra-
tion-court-domestic-violence-asylum-conservative-backlash (last visited Mar. 30, 
2016). 
 2 See, e.g., Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, paras. 25, 78 (Can.); Ex 
Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [647, 653] (appeal taken from Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.). 
 3 See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). 
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establish eligibility for asylum.4 The decision caused outrage, lead-
ing then Attorney General Janet Reno to vacate it and propose 
amendments to the asylum regulations.5 Although Ms. Alvarado 
was ultimately granted asylum in 2009 after a fourteen-year legal 
battle, the BIA’s decision denying her asylum continued to influence 
adjudicators for years to come.6 
After the BIA’s decision in R-A- and the saga that followed, in-
consistency from immigration judges created a patchwork of un-
published decisions that set no standard for adjudicating domestic 
violence asylum claims.7 Further complicating the issue, Janet 
Reno’s proposed amendments to the asylum regulations were never 
passed.8 As a result, asylum applicants were left with very little 
guidance on how to best argue their claims. 
In August 2014, when the BIA published A-R-C-G-, many 
hoped the court would clarify its position and set standards provid-
ing guidance for domestic violence asylum applicants. This Com-
ment discusses the BIA’s holding in A-R-C-G- and argues that, de-
spite the promising decision, amendments to the asylum regulations 
are still needed to guarantee the adequate adjudication of domestic 
violence asylum claims. Part I outlines the legal requirements for 
asylum in the United States and discusses the development of claims 
of gender-based persecution. Part II analyzes important domestic vi-
olence asylum claims prior to A-R-C-G-. Part III examines the BIA’s 
holding in A-R-C-G-. Part IV rebuts the primary argument against 
                                                                                                             
 4 Id. at 918. 
 5 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588–98 (proposed 
Dec. 7, 2000). 
 6 Matter of R-A-, CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-r (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
 7 See Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis 
of 206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 125–48 (2013). Because many asylum decisions are un-
published, it is difficult to obtain information on domestic violence asylum cases. 
To address this issue, the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies at University of 
California Hastings College of the Law has created an asylum database with in-
formation on over 9,000 asylum cases at all levels of adjudication. See CENTER 
FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, CGRS Asylum Records, http://cgrs.uchas-
tings.edu/search-materials/search-our-resources (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
 8 See Gerald Seipp, A Year in Review—Federal Courts Serving as “Gate-
keeper” To Assure that Legitimate Claims of Persecution are Recognized by the 
Department of Justice, 92 No. 39 Interpreter Releases 1821, 1822 (Oct. 12, 2015). 
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the BIA’s holding in A-R-C-G-, but argues that regulatory reform 
should nevertheless be implemented. Finally, this Comment con-
cludes that, while A-R-C-G- is laudable for finding that victims of 
domestic violence may qualify for asylum, the decision itself is not 
sufficient to clarify ambiguities in the law and ensure relief will be 
available for those who need it most. 
I.   ASYLUM LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER-BASED 
PERSECUTION AS GROUNDS FOR ASYLUM 
A.   What Constitutes a Refugee? 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) governs a noncit-
izen’s eligibility for asylum. A noncitizen may qualify for asylum if 
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) or the Attorney 
General determines that she is a refugee.9 The current definition of 
a refugee is found in the Refugee Act of 1980, and mirrors the lan-
guage of the United Nations refugee treaty.10 The Refugee Act states 
that a refugee is 
any person who is outside any country of such per-
son’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling 
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail him-
self or herself of the protection of, that country be-
cause of persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion.11 
Based on the refugee definition, an asylum applicant must show 
that (1) she has suffered persecution or she has a well-founded fear 
of persecution (2) by the state or by an entity the government is un-
                                                                                                             
 9 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 10 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, opened for signature 
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
 11 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
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willing or unable to control (3) “on account” of (4) a protected char-
acteristic.12 The applicant has the burden of proof in demonstrating 
that she meets the definition of a refugee and that she is not barred 
from asylum relief for any other reason.13 
B.   Persecution on Account of a Protected Ground 
Because the INA does not define what constitutes persecution, 
asylum applicants must look to precedent to interpret the specific 
types of harms that will be considered persecution.14 The BIA has 
defined persecution as “the infliction of harm or suffering by a gov-
ernment, or persons a government is unwilling or unable to control, 
to overcome a characteristic of the victim.”15 The U.S. courts of ap-
peals have also set forth definitions of persecution. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has defined persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm 
upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a 
way regarded as offensive,”16 while the Third Circuit has noted that 
persecution “is an extreme concept that does not include every sort 
of treatment our society regards as offensive.”17 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit has found that persecution “requir[es] more than a few isolated 
incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation.”18 
If an applicant can establish that the harm she suffered amounts 
to persecution, she “shall be presumed to have a well-founded fear 
of future persecution on the basis of the original claim.”19 If an ap-
plicant has not suffered persecution, but fears she will if she returns 
to her country of origin, then she must demonstrate that her fear is 
                                                                                                             
 12 Rebekah Morrissey, Avoiding the Rabbit Hole: Formulating Better Re-
quirements for Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
1121, 1127–28 (2012). 
 13 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2013); see also Elsa M. Bullard, Insufficient Gov-
ernment Protection: The Inescapable Element in Domestic Violence Asylum 
Cases, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1871 (2011). 
 14 Ilona Bray, What Counts as “Persecution” when Applying for Asylum or 
Refugee Status, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-counts-
persecution-when-applying-asylum-refugee-status.html (last visited Mar. 26, 
2016). 
 15 Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 16 Cordon-Garcia v. I.N.S., 204 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 17 Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1223, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 18 De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1008 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 19 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2013). 
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well-founded.20 An applicant’s fear is well-founded if (1) she has a 
fear of persecution in her home country on account of a protected 
characteristic; (2) there is a “reasonable possibility” of suffering 
such persecution if she were to return to that country; and (3) she is 
unable or unwilling to return to, or avail herself of the protection of, 
that country because of such fear.21 In determining whether an ap-
plicant’s fear of persecution is well-founded, a court will likely an-
alyze the subjective and objective components of the applicant’s 
claim.22 An applicant may establish a subjectively reasonable fear 
of persecution through credible testimony and an objectively rea-
sonable fear of persecution if a reasonable person in the applicant’s 
situation would fear persecution if made to return to the applicant’s 
country of origin.23 
Establishing past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution is not the end of the inquiry. An applicant must also 
show that the persecution is “on account of” race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.24 
In order to establish the required “nexus” between the persecutor’s 
motive and a protected ground, the applicant must show that her 
protected characteristic is “at least one central reason” for the perse-
cutor’s motivation.25 
Once the applicant has established either past persecution or a 
well-founded fear of future persecution, she must also show that re-
locating within her country of origin will not negate her fear of per-
secution.26 To determine whether internal relocation is reasonable, 
                                                                                                             
 20 Id. at § 208.13(b)(2). 
 21 Id. at § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(A)–(C). 
 22 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450 (1987) (“[T]he very lan-
guage of the term ‘well-founded fear’ demands a particular type of analysis—an 
examination of the subjective feelings of an applicant for asylum coupled with an 
inquiry into the objective nature of the articulated reasons for the fear.”) 
(Blackmun, J., Concurring). 
 23 See id. at 456–57. See also Bullard, supra note 13, at 1872. 
 24 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
 25 Id. at § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (“To establish that the applicant is a refugee within 
the meaning of such section, the applicant must establish that race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will 
be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”). 
 26 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b)(2)(ii) 
(applicants who “could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the ap-
plicant’s country of nationality” are not eligible for asylum). 
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the asylum regulations outline various factors that adjudicators 
should consider, such as geographical limitations, social and cultural 
constraints, and ongoing civil strife within the country.27 Addition-
ally, if the applicant has established past persecution, DHS can rebut 
the presumption of a fear of future persecution by showing that 
“[t]here has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that 
the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in the 
applicant’s country of nationality.”28 A fundamental change in cir-
cumstances could include a change in country conditions or a fun-
damental change in the applicant’s personal circumstances.29 
C.   Membership in a Particular Social Group 
Of the five statutorily protected grounds enumerated in the ref-
ugee definition, the “membership in a particular social group” cate-
gory is the most controversial.30 Some scholars have suggested that 
the social group ground was included because the drafters of the 
1951 Refugee Convention “recognized that no list could possibly 
encompass all of the reasons for which a deserving asylee might be 
persecuted.”31 The social group category therefore encompasses 
other distinct groups that might be targeted for persecution.32 
Part of the controversy surrounding the social group category 
arises due to the fact that the circuit courts of appeals use different 
                                                                                                             
 27 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3) (“[A]djudicators should consider, but are not 
limited to considering, whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the 
place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; admin-
istrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social 
and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties. 
Those factors may, or may not, be relevant, depending on all the circumstances of 
the case, and are not necessarily determinative of whether it would be reasonable 
for the applicant to relocate.”). 
 28 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). 
 29 Dina Sewell Finkell, Changed Circumstances and Country Conditions 
with Respect to Asylum, IMMIGRATION LAW ADVISOR, at *5, http://www.jus-
tice.gov/eoir/vll/ILA-Newsleter/ILA%202009/vol3no8.pdf. 
 30 See Bullard, supra note 13, at 1873. 
 31 Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 
YALE L.J. 2512, 2517 (2014). 
 32 Id. 
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standards to decide what constitutes a social group.33 The BIA, how-
ever, has established a two-prong test to evaluate whether a group 
meets the requirements for a particular social group. First, the group 
must be comprised of individuals who share a common, immutable 
characteristic that they cannot change or that is so fundamental to 
their identity that they should not be required to change it.34 Second, 
the group must be recognizable and distinct in society.35 
In 1985, the BIA attempted to clarify the requirements for 
“membership in a particular social group.”36 In Matter of Acosta, a 
Salvadoran taxi driver who was a founding member of a cooperative 
organization of taxi drivers (“COTAXI”) filed for asylum on the 
grounds that he feared persecution from Salvadoran guerillas “on 
account of his membership in a particular social group comprised of 
COTAXI drivers and persons engaged in the transportation industry 
of El Salvador.”37 The applicant testified that he had received death 
threats and that three of his friends had been killed shortly after re-
ceiving death threats.38 He also testified that he was assaulted in his 
taxi by three men who warned him not to call the police.39 
To interpret the meaning of “membership in a particular social 
group,” the Acosta court applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis, 
meaning “of the same kind.”40 The other grounds of persecution—
race, religion, nationality, and political opinion—describe a charac-
teristic “that either is beyond the power of an individual to change 
or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought 
                                                                                                             
 33 See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that a “‘particular social group’ is one united by a voluntary association, 
including a former association, or by an innate characteristic that is so fundamen-
tal to the identities or consciences of its members that members either cannot or 
should not be required to change it”); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 
1991) (“Like the traits which distinguish the other four enumerated categories–
race, religion, nationality and political opinion–the attributes of a particular social 
group must be recognizable and discrete.”). 
 34 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 35 Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 36 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232–35. 
 37 Id. at 232. 
 38 Id. at 216–17. 
 39 Id. at 217. 
 40 Id. at 233. 
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not be required to be changed.”41 Therefore, the court found the so-
cial group category can be established where the persecution “is di-
rected toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons 
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”42 The im-
mutable characteristic “must be one that the members of the group 
either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it 
is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”43 In 
Acosta, the characteristics defining the social group of which the 
applicant was a member were “being a taxi driver in San Salvador 
and refusing to participate in guerilla-sponsored work stoppages.”44 
The court found that neither of these characteristics was immutable 
“because the members of the group could avoid the threats of the 
guerrillas either by changing jobs or by cooperating in work stop-
pages.”45 Construing the social group category in this manner al-
lowed the court to “preserve the concept that refuge is restricted to 
individuals who are either unable by their own actions, or as a matter 
of conscience should not be required, to avoid persecution.”46 
In 2006, the BIA identified another consideration applicable to 
determining eligibility as a member of a particular social group. In 
Matter of C-A-, the asylum applicant operated a bakery, where he 
became acquainted with the chief of security for the Cali drug car-
tel.47 Between 1990 and 1994, the chief of security visited the appli-
cant’s bakery and talked openly about his involvement with the Cali 
cartel, including events relating to the cartel’s exportation of narcot-
ics.48 The applicant passed along the information he learned to a 
friend who, as the General Counsel for the city of Cali, was respon-
sible for investigating and prosecuting drug traffickers.49 In 1995, 
the applicant was outside with his son when a car blocked their 
path.50 Three men with guns attempted to force the applicant into 
                                                                                                             
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 234. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 952 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
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the car, but he refused.51 They beat him and hit his son in the face 
with a gun.52 Before leaving, they told him that things would get 
worse for him and that they would also go after the General Coun-
sel.53 
The applicant sought asylum on the grounds that he was a mem-
ber of the particular social group of noncriminal drug informants 
working against the Cali drug cartel.54 The court first determined 
that having informed on the Cali cartel was not an immutable char-
acteristic under the Acosta test because “a person who agrees to 
work as a government informant . . . takes a calculated risk and is 
not in a position to claim refugee status should such risks material-
ize.”55 The court then addressed the “recognizability, i.e., the social 
visibility”56 of the purported social group. To emphasize the im-
portance of the social visibility component, the court looked to 
United Nations guidelines and confirmed that “‘visibility’ is an im-
portant element in identifying the existence of a particular social 
group.”57 While the court recognized the applicant’s sympathetic 
circumstances, it held that “informants are not in a substantially dif-
ferent situation from anyone who has crossed the Cali cartel or who 
is perceived to be a threat to the cartel’s interests.”58 Because the 
purported social group was not sufficiently distinct from the general 
population of Colombia, the group lacked the requisite social visi-
bility.59 
Since C-A-, the BIA has attempted to clarify the social visibility 
requirement. In Matter of W-G-R-, a former gang member from El 
Salvador filed for asylum and withholding of removal60 on the 
grounds that he feared persecution on account of his membership in 
a particular social group consisting of “former members of the Mara 
                                                                                                             
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 957. 
 55 Id. at 958. 
 56 Id. at 959. 
 57 Id. at 960. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 961. 
 60 While this Comment focuses on asylum, W-G-R- is relevant because much 
of the same analysis applies to withholding of removal claims. 
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18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their gang member-
ship.”61 The applicant testified that he was in the gang for less than 
a year, but was confronted and attacked by members of the gang 
after he renounced his membership.62 He was shot in the leg during 
one of the two attacks he suffered as a result of leaving the gang.63 
He later fled to the United States.64 
The immigration judge pretermitted the applicant’s application 
for asylum as untimely filed and denied him withholding of removal 
on the grounds that he did not establish that he was persecuted on 
account of his membership in a particular social group.65 The appli-
cant appealed the denial of withholding to the BIA, arguing that the 
social visibility and particularity requirements were inconsistent 
with BIA precedent and the standards of international refugee law.66 
The BIA affirmed its prior holdings that “both particularity and so-
cial visibility are critical elements in determining whether a group is 
cognizable as a particular social group.”67 However, the court rec-
ognized that the term “visibility” created confusion surrounding the 
requirement of whether or not a group needed to be seen by soci-
ety.68 To clarify, the court renamed the social visibility element the 
“social distinction” element “to clarify that social visibility does not 
mean ‘ocular visibility.’”69 Rather, the element requires that the 
group be perceived by society.70 The court then dismissed the appli-
cant’s appeal, finding that he did not establish that former gang 
members in El Salvador who had renounced their membership were 
“perceived, considered, or recognized in Salvadoran society as a dis-
tinct group.”71 
                                                                                                             
 61 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 211. 
 67 Id. at 212. 
 68 Id. at 216. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 222. The court did not reach the issue of whether the Salvadoran 
government was unable or unwilling to control Mara 18 members because the 
immigration judge made no findings on that issue. Id. at 224. 
1046 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1035 
	
D.   The Origins of Gender-Based Asylum 
Historically, adjudicators in the United States have generally de-
nied gender-based asylum claims.72 Because the law does not rec-
ognize such claims in and of themselves, women who have suffered 
persecution based on their gender must file under one of the five 
statutorily protected grounds in the refugee definition.73 An early 
gender-based claim from 1975 demonstrates the obstacles women 
face when applying for asylum or withholding of removal based on 
gender-specific persecution. In Matter of Pierre, a Haitian woman 
filed for withholding of removal on the grounds that she feared per-
secution from her husband who held a position of power in the Hai-
tian government.74 The applicant testified that, before leaving Haiti, 
her husband “threatened her life and attempted to kill her by burning 
down the house in which she lived.”75 She did not argue that she 
feared persecution on account of one of the statutorily protected 
grounds required for withholding of removal, but that her husband’s 
position in the government would foreclose her from receiving pro-
tection in Haiti, “and that this in turn amounts to persecution which 
the government of Haiti would do nothing to restrain.”76 
The BIA denied her withholding claim on the grounds that the 
persecution she suffered was not on account of her membership in 
one of the statutorily protected classes.77 Instead, the court found 
that the motivation behind her husband’s actions appeared to be 
“strictly personal,” and therefore her claim did not merit protection 
under the law. 78 
Beginning in the 1990s, however, the United States began to 
take steps toward recognizing some gender-specific asylum 
claims.79 In 1995, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
                                                                                                             
 72 T.S. Twibell, The Development of Gender as a Basis for Asylum in United 
States Immigration Law and Under the United Nations Refugee Convention: Case 
Studies of Female Asylum Seekers from Cameroon, Eritrea, Iraq, and Somalia, 
24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 189, 196 (2010). 
 73 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
 74 Matter of Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 461–62 (B.I.A. 1975). 
 75 Id. at 462. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 462–63. 
 78 Id. at 463. 
 79 See Twibell, supra note 72, at 197. 
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(“INS”)80 issued a memorandum to asylum officers on adjudicating 
asylum claims for women.81 Although the memorandum was written 
only to provide “guidance and background,” the INS issued it as re-
quired reading for all interviewing and supervising asylum offic-
ers.82 The memorandum stated that “gender-related claims can raise 
issues of particular complexity, and it is important that United States 
asylum adjudicators understand those complexities and give proper 
consideration to gender-related claims.”83 
Two years later, in 1996, the BIA issued its first precedential 
decision establishing that women fleeing gender-based persecution 
could be eligible for asylum in the United States.84 In Matter of 
Kasinga, a Togolese asylum applicant was forced into a polygamous 
marriage at the age of seventeen, and, under tribal custom, would 
have been forced to submit to female genital mutilation (“FGM”) 
before the marriage was consummated.85 With the help of her sister, 
the applicant fled Togo and ultimately reached the United States, 
where she immediately requested asylum.86 
After an immigration judge denied her asylum, the applicant ap-
pealed to the BIA.87 On appeal, she argued that she belonged to the 
particular social group of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu 
Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who 
oppose the practice.”88 The BIA applied the Acosta criteria and rec-
ognized a social group defined in part by gender.89 The court found 
                                                                                                             
 80 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135) 
dismantled the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). The Act 
separated the former agency into three components within DHS: U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”), and Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”). 
 81 Phyllis Coven, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Considerations for Asylum Officers 
Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women (May 26, 1995), 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/65633.htm. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Matter of Kasinga (1996), CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-kasinga-1996 (last visited Mar. 27, 
2016). 
 85 Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 86 Id. at 358–59. 
 87 Id. at 357. 
 88 Id. at 365. 
 89 Id. at 365–66. 
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that “[t]he characteristics of being a ‘young woman’ and a ‘member 
of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe’ cannot be changed.90 The charac-
teristic of having intact genitalia is one that is so fundamental to the 
individual identity of a young woman that she should not be required 
to change it.”91 The court therefore granted the applicant asylum, 
finding that she had a well-founded fear of persecution by or with 
the acquiescence of the government on account of her membership 
in the defined social group.92 
Kasinga was praised as a crucial and momentous ruling.93 Alt-
hough the decision persuaded some immigration judges to begin 
granting asylum in gender-based claims,94 a decision from the BIA 
three years later would create conflicting interpretations for domes-
tic violence claims. 
II.   DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASYLUM BEFORE A-R-C-G- 
A.   Matter of R-A- 
On June 11, 1999, the BIA issued its first precedential decision 
on domestic violence asylum.95 The applicant, Rody Alvarado, mar-
ried her husband at sixteen years old in her native Guatemala.96 
From the beginning of their marriage, Ms. Alvarado suffered repug-
nant physical and sexual abuse at the hands of her husband: 
[Ms. Alvarado’s husband] dislocated [her] jaw bone 
when her menstrual period was 15 days late. When 
she refused to abort her 3-to 4-month-old fetus, he 
kicked her violently in her spine . . . [He] raped her 
repeatedly. He would beat her before and during the 
                                                                                                             
 90 See id. at 366. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 367. 
 93 See U.S. Ruling on Genital Mutilation Hailed, CHI. TRIB. (June 15, 1996), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-06-15/news/9606150074_1_mutilation-
board-of-immigration-appeals-immigration-judges. 
 94 Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 
206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 123–124 (2013). 
 95 Id. at 113. 
 96 Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908 (B.I.A. 1999). 
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unwanted sex . . . Once, he kicked the respondent in 
her genitalia, apparently for no reason, causing the 
respondent to bleed severely for 8 days. The respond-
ent suffered the most pain when he forcefully sodo-
mized her . . . One night, he woke the respondent, 
struck her face, whipped her with an electrical cord, 
pulled out a machete and threatened to deface her, to 
cut off her arms and legs, and to leave her in a wheel-
chair if she ever tried to leave him . . . Whenever he 
could not find something, he would grab her head 
and strike furniture with it.97 
The immigration judge granted Ms. Alvarado asylum, finding 
that she had been persecuted on account of her membership in the 
particular social group of “Guatemalan women who have been in-
volved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe 
that women are to live under male dominion.”98  On appeal, the BIA 
reversed the immigration judge’s decision, finding that Ms. Al-
varado’s proffered social group was “described largely in the ab-
stract” and bore “little or no relation to the way in which Guatema-
lans might identify subdivisions within their own society.”99 Even if 
the proposed social group met Acosta’s “immutability” requirement, 
Ms. Alvarado failed to show that the group was a cognizable one, 
meaning that the victims of spousal abuse in Guatemala view them-
selves as members of such a group or that the male oppressors view 
their victims as part of this group.100 
Adding further confusion to its holding, the BIA attempted to 
differentiate R-A- from Matter of Kasinga, finding that Ms. Al-
varado had not shown that spousal abuse is itself “an important so-
cietal attribute.”101 Unlike the applicant in Matter of Kasinga, who 
had shown that women of her tribe were expected by society to un-
dergo female genital mutilation, Ms. Alvarado did not show that 
                                                                                                             
 97 Id. at 908–10. 
 98 Id. at 911. The immigration judge also found that Ms. Alvarado qualified 
for asylum on account of an imputed political opinion. See id. This Comment, 
however, focuses on Ms. Alvarado’s claim for asylum on account of her member-
ship in a particular social group. 
 99 Id. at 918. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. at 919. 
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women in Guatemala were expected by society to be abused, “or 
that there are any adverse societal consequences to women or their 
husbands if the women are not abused.”102 
The BIA also addressed Ms. Alvarado’s argument that govern-
ments can be responsible for private actors when they fail to afford 
protection.103 The court rejected the argument, however, because the 
record did not establish that the actions of Ms. Alvarado’s husband 
“represent[ed] desired behavior within Guatemala or that the Gua-
temalan government encourages domestic abuse.”104 The BIA was 
cautious to note that it found the conduct of Ms. Alvarado’s husband 
“deplorable,”105 but ultimately it concluded that her proposed social 
group was merely a “legally crafted description of some attributes 
of her tragic personal circumstances.”106 Because Ms. Alvarado had 
not established a cognizable social group or a nexus between the 
group and her well-founded fear of persecution, the BIA found her 
ineligible for asylum.107 
A year after the BIA’s controversial decision in Matter of R-A-, 
Attorney General Janet Reno proposed new regulations regarding 
asylum and withholding of removal claims.108 Ms. Alvarado’s case 
was stayed pending the finalized regulations.109 Her case was then 
reopened in 2004 when Attorney General John Ashcroft certified the 
case to himself.110 At that time, DHS also filed a brief stating that 
the respondent’s claim warranted asylum.111 In 2005, Ashcroft re-
manded the case to the BIA with order to decide the case when the 
regulations were finalized.112 Ms. Alvarado waited another three 
years in limbo until 2008, when Attorney General Michael Mukasey 
                                                                                                             
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 922. 
 104 Id. at 923. 
 105 Id. at 910. 
 106 Id. at 919. 
 107 Id. at 927. 
 108 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588–98 (proposed 
Dec. 7, 2000); see also Marsden, supra note 31, at 2529; Developments in Do-
mestic Violence Asylum Timeline (1985-2010), CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE 
STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Timeline_Domestic_Vio-
lence_Asylum.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) [hereinafter Timeline]. 
 109 Marsden, supra note 31, at 2529. 
 110 See id. See also Timeline, supra note 108. 
 111 See Marsden, supra note 31, at 2529. See also Timeline, supra note 108. 
 112 See Timeline, supra note 108. 
2016] MATTER OF A-R-C-G- AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASYLUM 1051 
	
certified the case to himself, with order to decide the case without 
waiting for the finalization of the regulations.113 The BIA then re-
manded the case back to the immigration judge, who granted the 
respondent asylum in 2009, fourteen years after she first applied in 
1995.114 Unfortunately, the final grant of asylum was made by a San 
Francisco immigration judge, and therefore did not produce any 
binding precedent for future domestic violence asylum claims.115 
B.   Matter of L-R- 
While R-A- was still pending on remand to the immigration 
judge, another notable domestic violence asylum case was under-
way. In Matter of L-R-, Ms. L-R- “suffered nearly two decades of 
unrelenting physical, sexual and emotional torment at the hands of 
her common law husband” in Mexico.116 After abducting her at gun-
point and forcing her to live with him, he abused her on a daily ba-
sis.117 The abuse consisted of rape, public beatings, threats, and an 
attempt to burn her alive.118 After “numerous futile attempts” to get 
help from the Mexican authorities, she fled to the United States.119 
The immigration judge denied Ms. L-R-’s claim, concluding that 
the persecution she suffered did not make her eligible for asylum 
because her husband “beat her simply because he was a violent man, 
not because of her gender or status in the relationship.”120 On appeal, 
the BIA requested additional briefing in light of the recent develop-
ments in Matter of R-A-.121 As a result, DHS filed a brief stating its 
                                                                                                             
 113 See id. 
 114 See Marsden, supra note 31, at 2530. See also Timeline, supra note 108; 
Matter of R-A-, CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchas-
tings.edu/our-work/matter-r (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
 115 See Marsden, supra note 31, at 2530. 
 116 Brief of Respondents in Support of Application for Asylum, Withholding 
of Removal and CAT Relief at 10, Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/L-R-_brief_immigra-
tion_court_03_10_2010.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Matter of L-R-, CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-l-r (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
 121 Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief, Matter of L-R-, at *3 
(B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Mat-
ter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
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official position on domestic violence asylum: “DHS accepts that in 
some cases, a victim of domestic violence may be a member of a 
cognizable particular social group and may be able to show that her 
abuse was or would be persecution on account of such member-
ship.”122 Ultimately Ms. L-R-’s case was remanded and DHS agreed 
to stipulate that she was eligible for asylum.123 Although her grant 
of asylum did not create binding precedent, DHS’s position itself is 
binding on asylum officers and DHS trial attorneys.124 As such, 
DHS trial attorneys are effectively precluded from making argu-
ments that are inconsistent with the agency’s official position in the 
brief.125 
Despite DHS’s official position that asylum claims based on do-
mestic violence may be viable, many immigration judges continued 
to deny victims’ claims.126 Some denials were based on the appli-
cants’ failure to satisfy other eligibility criteria, others were the re-
sult of general skepticism regarding “the viability of domestic vio-
lence as a basis for asylum under any circumstances,” and others 
were due to a lack of clear guidance from the BIA.127 Whatever the 
reasoning, decisions after L-R- appeared to create even more confu-
sion for victims of domestic violence hoping to seek refuge in the 
United States. 
III.   THE BIA CHANGES COURSE IN MATTER OF A-R-C-G- 
On August 26, 2014, fourteen years after denying Ms. Alvarado 
asylum in Matter of R-A-, the BIA issued its first published decision 
recognizing domestic violence as a basis for asylum. In Matter of A-
R-C-G-, Aminta Cifuentes suffered heinous abuse by her husband 
                                                                                                             
 122 Id. at *12. 
 123 Matter of L-R-, CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-l-r (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See Bookey, supra note 94, at 138–40. See also, e.g., CGRS Database Case 
#3353 (2009) (on file with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies); CGRS Da-
tabase Case #8747 (2009) (on file with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies); 
CGRS Database Case #8767 (2009) (on file with the Center for Gender & Refugee 
Studies). 
 127 Bookey, supra note 94, at 141–43. 
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in her native Guatemala.128 Ms. Cifuentes’ husband broke her nose, 
burned her breast with paint thinner, and raped her.129 He also hit 
her in the stomach so hard that she gave birth prematurely.130 Ms. 
Cifuentes contacted the police, but they refused to interfere in a mar-
ital relationship.131 When she tried to leave her husband and stay 
with her father, her husband found her and threatened to kill her if 
she did not return to him.132 She attempted to escape the abuse by 
moving to Guatemala City, but her husband found her and con-
vinced her to return with him by promising he would stop the 
abuse.133 The abuse did not stop, however, so Ms. Cifuentes fled 
Guatemala for the United States.134 
Ms. Cifuentes applied for asylum on the grounds that she feared 
persecution in her native Guatemala on account of her membership 
in the particular social group of “married women in Guatemala who 
are unable to leave their relationship.”135 The immigration judge re-
jected her claim, finding that her husband abused her “arbitrarily and 
without reason,” not in order to overcome the fact that Ms. Cifuentes 
was a member in the described social group.136 
On appeal, the BIA disagreed with the immigration judge, find-
ing that Ms. Cifuentes had established past persecution on account 
of a particular social group.137 The court analyzed the facts of Ms. 
Cifuentes’ claim under the recent precedents interpreting the mean-
ing of the term “particular social group.”138 First, the court held that 
Ms. Cifuentes’ defined social group was “composed of members 
who share the common immutable characteristic of gender.”139 
Next, the BIA found that the social group met the particularity re-
quirements because the terms “women,” “married,” and “unable to 
                                                                                                             
 128 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving 
Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L LAW 1, 5 (2016). 
 131 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389. 
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 135 Id. at 388–89. 
 136 Id. at 389–90. 
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leave” “have commonly accepted definitions within Guatemalan so-
ciety,” which “can combine to create a group with discrete and de-
finable boundaries.”140 Finally, the court found that the group was 
socially distinct because evidence showed that Guatemalan society 
has a culture of family violence and that sexual offenses remain “a 
serious problem.”141 These factors, along with evidence of the Gua-
temalan authorities’ failure to assist victims of domestic violence, 
were sufficient to establish that Guatemalan society “makes mean-
ingful distinctions based on the common immutable characteristics 
of being a married woman in a domestic relationship that she cannot 
leave.”142 After finding Ms. Cifuentes’ social group cognizable, the 
BIA remanded the case to the immigration judge to determine Ms. 
Cifuentes’ eligibility for asylum.143 On remand, the immigration 
judge granted asylum to Ms. Cifuentes.144 
IV.   A-R-C-G-: CONTROVERSY, CRITICISM, AND A CALL FOR 
CLARITY 
A.   Controversy and Criticism 
While A-R-C-G- has the potential to afford protection to women 
that have escaped domestic abuse, it has sparked criticism from anti-
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 144 See Bookey, supra note 130, at 9. 
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immigration activists. 145 These activists most often base their con-
cerns on the “floodgates” theory,146 arguing that opening our doors 
to victims of domestic violence will overwhelm the system by incit-
ing a flood of female immigrants to seek refuge in the United 
States.147 In the context of domestic violence asylum, the “flood-
gates” argument is both unsubstantiated and unrealistic. First, the 
critics of A-R-C-G- fail to recognize that domestic violence asylum 
applicants face a multitude of other obstacles, both personal and le-
gal, that prevent them from obtaining asylum. Second, neither the 
United States nor other countries have experienced a dramatic in-
crease in asylum applications after recognizing certain large groups 
as potentially eligible for asylum. 
1.   THE FLOODGATES ARGUMENT IS UNREALISTIC  
Even with the benefit of A-R-C-G-, it is unrealistic to expect that 
victims of domestic violence will now travel to the United States in 
“floods” to obtain asylum. The unfortunate reality is that most of 
those who would be eligible for domestic violence asylum will not 
be lucky enough to even reach the United States.148 Refugee expert 
Karen Musalo explains the obstacles that domestic violence asylum 
victims must overcome in order to escape their countries of origin: 
                                                                                                             
 145 See Redden, supra note 1 (“Fox News host Brian Kilmeade fumed that the 
decision would allow Guatemalan women to ‘get instant US citizenship as well 
as our benefits.’”); id. (“Steven Camarota . . . implied that the ruling would entice 
‘tens or hundreds of millions’ of women to enter the US illegally.”). See also The 
Times Editorial Board, In a World Full of Persecution, How Many People Can 
the U.S. Protect?, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-guatemala-20140915-
story.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (“Still, the United States can’t protect eve-
ryone who needs protection.”); Julia Preston, In First for Court, Woman is Ruled 
Eligible for Asylum in U.S. on Basis of Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/us/victim-of-domestic-violence-in-
guatemala-is-ruled-eligible-for-asylum-in-us.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 30, 
2016) (“Some critics predicted the numbers of foreign women seeking asylum 
could soon overwhelm the system.”). 
 146 See Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of 
Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 132 
(2007) (“Perhaps the overarching basis for the opposition to gender claims is the 
fear that acceptance of these cases will result in the floodgates.”). 
 147 See id. 
 148 See id. at 133. 
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Women who would have legitimate claims for gen-
der asylum often come from countries where they 
have [few] or no rights, which limits their ability to 
leave their countries in search of protec-
tion . . . .[T]hey are frequently—if not always—pri-
mary caretakers for their children and extended fam-
ily. Thus they often have to choose between leaving 
family behind, or exposing them to the risks of travel 
to the potential country of refuge . . . .[W]omen asy-
lum seekers often have little control over family re-
sources, making it impossible for them to have the 
means to travel to a country where they might seek 
asylum.149 
In addition to the personal challenges, victims of domestic vio-
lence that are lucky enough to escape their abusers must also navi-
gate the complex immigration system in the United States. As de-
tailed in Part I of this Note, to have a viable claim for asylum, an 
applicant must establish that she suffered past persecution or that 
she fears future persecution on account of her membership in a par-
ticular social group.150 She must also show that the government in 
her native country was unwilling or unable to control her abuser.151 
These evidentiary standards are high, considering that many women 
who flee their native countries in fear for their lives likely do so 
without first acquiring documentary evidence to support an asylum 
claim.152 
The vague and inconsistent administrative framework in place 
for adjudicating asylum claims often creates another uphill battle for 
victims of domestic violence seeking refuge in the United States.153 
                                                                                                             
 149 See id. 
 150 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
 151 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 395 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 152 See Allison W. Reimann, Hope for the Future? The Asylum Claims of 
Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1259 
(2009). 
 153 See Morrissey, supra note 12, at 1143 (“The vague nature of asylum law 
forces applicants to exist in limbo and undertake long and costly legal battles to 
gain asylum.”); Marsden, supra note 31, at 2514 (“The odds of this particular form 
of ‘refugee roulette’ vary wildly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, immigration 
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While asylum officers can grant asylum, immigration judges, who 
are appointed by the Attorney General, are responsible for deciding 
the majority of asylum cases.154 Immigration judges are often ap-
pointed based on their political connections rather than their quali-
fications or experience in immigration law,155 and they are given 
wide discretion when deciding asylum claims.156 A study conducted 
by three law professors that analyzed 140,000 decisions by immi-
gration judges over the course of four years found that the outcome 
of immigration cases is often influenced by factors such as the loca-
tion of the court and the sex and background of the judge.157 The 
study found that female immigration judges grant asylum at a forty-
four percent higher rate than their male colleagues.158 The study also 
found that a Haitian seeking refuge from political violence is almost 
twice as likely to obtain asylum in New York as in Miami.159 The 
inconsistencies in the judges’ decisions are troubling because of the 
potential impact they could have on refugees’ lives. As one of the 
authors of the study noted, “these decisions can mean life or death, 
                                                                                                             
judge to immigration judge, and asylum officer to asylum officer.”); Bookey, su-
pra note 94, at 147–48 (“To put it plainly, whether a woman fleeing domestic 
violence will receive protection in the United States seems to depend not on the 
consistent application of objective principles, but rather on the view of her indi-
vidual judge, often untethered to any legal principles at all.”); Jaya Ramji-
Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Dispar-
ities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 302 (2007) (“[I]n the world 
of asylum adjudication, there is remarkable variation in decision making from one 
official to the next, from one office to the next, from one region to the next, from 
one Court of Appeals to the next, and from one year to the next, even during 
periods when there has been no intervening change in the law.). 
 154 See Julia Preston, Big Disparities in Judging of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 31, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/washington/31asy-
lum.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Mar. 27, 2016). 
 155 Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on 
GOP Ties, WASH. POST (June 11, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001229.html. 
 156 Preston, supra note 154 (“The wide discretion exercised by immigration 
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and they seem to a large extent to be the result of a clerk’s random 
assignment of a case to a particular judge.”160 
Statutory exceptions also create barriers for asylum appli-
cants.161 The exceptions include a one-year filing deadline, a bar for 
those previously denied asylum by an immigration judge or the BIA, 
and a bar for those who can be removed to a safe third party coun-
try.162 The one-year filing deadline, which requires an applicant 
seeking asylum to apply within one year of entering the United 
States, can be particularly problematic for victims of domestic 
abuse. Although regulatory exceptions to the one-year deadline may 
apply in “extraordinary” circumstances,163 such as post-traumatic 
stress disorder, they are narrowly construed.164 Other compelling 
circumstances, such as difficulty accessing legal counsel or a lack 
of knowledge of the relief available, would most likely not be con-
sidered “extraordinary” enough for an adjudicator to waive the 
deadline.165 
2.   THE FLOODGATES ARGUMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY PAST 
EXPERIENCE 
The floodgates argument is further weakened by statistics from 
other countries and the United States showing that increased ap-
proval of gender-related claims does not result in a surge of such 
claims. In 1993, Canada was the first country in the world to issue 
“Gender Guidelines” and give protection to women that had fled 
gender-related violence and persecution.166 Since then, Canada has 
maintained statistics on gender-based asylum claims and reported 
no increase in claims in the seven years following the adoption of 
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 161 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2012). 
 162 Id. at § 1158(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
 163 Id. at § 1158(a)(2)(D). 
 164 National Immigrant Justice Center, The One-Year Asylum Filing Deadline 
Delays or Denies Protection to Women Fleeing Persecution, http://immigrantjus-
tice.org/sites/immigrantjus-
tice.org/files/FINAL%20One%20Year%20Asylum%20Filing%20Deadline%20-
%20Women%20Case%20Stories%2006%2015%2013.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 
2016). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Musalo, supra note 146, at 133. 
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the Gender Guidelines.167 In fact, gender-based claims consistently 
constituted “only a miniscule fraction” of Canada’s total claims.168 
Even in the United States, statistics have not shown a dramatic 
increase in asylum claims from purported members of a particular 
social group after the group has been recognized as such. One 
scholar has labeled the floodgates argument “absurd,” noting that 
“[t]he BIA and US federal courts . . . have recognized many broad 
groups as eligible for asylum, including any Coptic Christian living 
in Egypt, any Filipino of Chinese ancestry living in the Philippines, 
or any gay or lesbian person living in Cuba.”169 Many of those who 
opposed the decision in Matter of Kasinga predicted that millions of 
women are subject to female genital mutilation every year, and that 
the U.S. “would be overwhelmed with asylum seekers if it recog-
nized fear of FGC as a basis for asylum.”170 Statistics showed, how-
ever, that INS did not see a dramatic increase in the number of asy-
lum claims based on female genital mutilation after the BIA issued 
its decision.171 
A closer look at the floodgates theory shows that the argument 
has little, if any, merit. It nevertheless raises an important question: 
should the fear of a flood of arriving immigrants justify closing our 
doors to women facing life-threatening situations? While speaking 
at a recent symposium, Justice John Paul Stevens noted that “the fair 
administration of justice is never cost-free.”172 In the case of domes-
tic violence asylum, sending applicants back to countries that cannot 
protect them would be unreasonable even if granting them asylum 
would result in an increase in the number of asylum applications 
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filed in the United States. The cost of the fair administration of jus-
tice for those fleeing domestic abuse is surely outweighed by the 
benefit of a life saved. 
B.   A Call for Clarity: Continuing Need for Regulatory Reform 
The BIA’s decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- should be celebrated 
for providing victims of domestic abuse with a potential path for 
obtaining asylum in the United States. The decision itself, however, 
is a narrow one, and it does not clarify many of the underlying am-
biguities in domestic violence asylum law.173 In order to provide 
clarity and generate more consistent decisions, DHS should imple-
ment the asylum regulations that were proposed by Janet Reno fol-
lowing the R-A- decision. 
Although Matter of A-R-C-G- is an important initial step in rec-
ognizing domestic violence asylum claims, DHS should nonetheless 
implement the proposed amendments to the asylum regulations to 
clarify lingering ambiguities in the law.174 “The best way to solidify 
the legal foundation for domestic violence asylum, reduce incon-
sistency in asylum adjudications, and make domestic violence asy-
lum permanent is through the regulatory process.”175 The primary 
benefit of Reno’s proposed regulations is that they provide more 
uniform definitions of the terms used in asylum law, such as “par-
ticular social group” and “social visibility.”176 Importantly, the 
amendments were “developed with an awareness of the circum-
stances surrounding persecution against women and recognize[] that 
domestic violence is not only a private matter and may, under certain 
circumstances, qualify the victim for a grant of asylum.”177 
While the proposed amendments do not carve out any special 
categories for domestic violence asylum claims,178 they do include 
                                                                                                             
 173 For further discussion on the scope of the ruling and how it has affected 
recent decision-making in immigration courts, see Bookey, supra note 130. 
 174 Morrissey, supra note 12, at 1145 (“The lack of clarity creates a system of 
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 175 Marsden, supra note 31, at 2539. 
 176 See Morrissey, supra note 12, at 1144. 
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Rule, at *1 (Dec. 7, 2000), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressre-
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 178 Id. at 2. 
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several important changes: (1) the amendments clarify that sex can 
constitute a particular social group; (2) the amendments provide that 
an applicant need not prove that her persecutor was subjectively mo-
tivated to harm her; and (3) the amendments suggest that the nexus 
element may be established by a showing of societal norms and cus-
toms.179 For domestic violence survivors seeking asylum, these 
changes could be significant. While the A-R-C-G- court found that 
Ms. Cifuentes’ proffered gender-based social group was cognizable, 
the court limited its holding by noting that “in the domestic violence 
context, the issue of social distinction will depend on the facts and 
evidence in each individual case.”180 According to the court, sup-
porting evidence might include “documented country conditions; 
law enforcement statistics and expert witnesses, if proffered; the 
[applicant’s] past experiences; and other reliable and credible 
sources of information.”181 Many domestic violence asylum appli-
cants may appear pro se, however, which would limit their ability to 
obtain documented country conditions, statistics, and expert wit-
nesses. The amended regulations are therefore needed to clarify that, 
despite evidentiary requirements, sex can constitute a particular so-
cial group. 
The amendments are also beneficial to domestic violence asy-
lum seekers because they loosen the nexus requirements in the par-
ticular social group analysis. In A-R-C-G-, DHS conceded that the 
abuse Ms. Cifuentes endured was, “for at least one central reason, 
on account of her membership in a cognizable particular social 
group.”182 The court accepted DHS’s concession and did not address 
the issue other than to note that “the issue of nexus will depend on 
the facts and circumstances of an individual claim.”183 As such, im-
plementing the proposed amendments would help provide guidance 
on the nexus requirement where A-R-C-G- does not. 
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CONCLUSION 
Matter of A-R-C-G- is a landmark decision and an important step 
toward recognizing the viability of domestic violence asylum 
claims. The binding precedent from the highest administrative tri-
bunal in the United States is encouraging and will undoubtedly have 
positive implications for victims of domestic abuse that seek refuge 
in the United States. Nevertheless, A-R-C-G-’s narrow holding rests 
against the backdrop of a confusing and inconsistent history of do-
mestic violence asylum adjudication. The BIA’s (limited) endorse-
ment of domestic violence as a possible basis for asylum suggests 
that regulatory reform is still needed to clarify lingering ambiguities 
in the law. As such, the United States should implement amend-
ments to the asylum regulations to ensure more consistent decision-
making in the cases of women fleeing domestic violence. Regula-
tory reform, coupled with the BIA’s groundbreaking holding in A-
R-C-G-, would provide victims of domestic abuse with meaningful 
protection under United States immigration law. 
